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Concepts
Princess
2
Princess
2 Rejuvenated
Ambassador Development Story
Specifications
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www.leylandprincess.co.uk
 
THE
DEVELOPMENT STORY
The ADO17 or ‘Land Crab’ did not have
a particularly distinguished career as BMC’s flagship front-wheel-drive
model. Sales were disappointing because the car – which possessed a great
deal of potential – simply did not appeal to the target buyers. Even though
the car was an unreserved sale flop, BMC undertook no work into replacing the
car, which meant that it would be down to Leyland to formulate plans – and
because it was younger than the ADO16, it would have to take second place to
it. Once Donald Stokes (BLMC’s Chairman) had finalised the company’s plans in
the lower mid range, attention was finally turned towards ADO17 and how best
to replace it. Initial thoughts on the matter were put down by Filmer
Paradise (BLMC’s marketing director) on the 27th February 1970
(some six years after the launch of the ADO17), which was contained in a
confidential memorandum, submitted to members of the Product Policy
Committee.
Echoing the thoughts of John Barber
(one of two deputy managing directors; the other was George Turnbull)
Paradise made it clear the main growth in the car market would be the
upper-medium sector, referred to as the ‘’D Class’’ (which back in 1970
referred to anything over 1500cc) and that as the ADO17 badly needed
replacing, it would make sense to pitch it’s replacement further upmarket.
This plan was, in the opinion of Paradise, one that Austin Morris most urgently
needed to instigate and that the resultant car should be European influenced
in order to effectively meet the challenges of the late seventies.
The initial thoughts were that the
car should be rear wheel drive and have
“European” styling, but the decision to continue with front wheel
drive was swiftly (and correctly) made by Product Planning, who felt that the
ADO17 engine/transmission pack would make an ideal base for the new car.
Besides, changing over to rear wheel drive would send out confused signals to
the car buying public and the company that did so much in pioneering front
wheel drive for the masses should stick to this format. At this time, the car
was given project name “Diablo”, which encompassed another car already in
development.
Once the mechanical packaging of the
car was settled, the finer details were looked at – and the ADO71 became a
more serious study. Initial thoughts were that the E-Series engine would be
the entry-level power pack, which had the advantage over the B-Series as having
a 5-speed gearbox and the higher models would use the E6 engine, already
employed in the older car, but with the added update of a 5-speed gearbox.
The body of the car could be allowed to grow in order to match the Opel
Rekord, Peugeot 504 or Ford Cortina III, but more importantly, to facilitate
a less upright driving position, allow a larger boot than the ADO17 and
improve the cars crash worthiness. Importantly, because the ADO17 was a
tremendously commodious car and the ADO71 was based upon it, it would have
class-leading passenger space.
BMC board approval was given to the
ADO71 at this point and development of the car now continued apace. The man
chosen to create the look of the ADO71 was Harris Mann, who had previously
worked on the Morris Marina and created the Austin Allegro – and since the
BLMC design studio had been moved from Cowley to Longbridge in 1970, had
replaced Roy Haynes in overall charge of car design. Back in 1969, after Mann
had been asked to create a sports car design of the future (which ended up as
the Zanda, a good looking design exercise for a sports coupe that had been
presented to the press at the Earls Court Motor Show), he was asked to
produce a saloon in the same vein. Unlike the Zanda, which made it to a full
size prototype, the saloon car was no more than a paper study, but the
drawings were issued as part of a press release.
The saloon concept caught the
attention of upper management and so, Mann was asked to develop the concept
further. The idea was that the completely captured the upmarket aspirations
that the company had for the ADO71 and so the styling work that Harris Mann
had been working on was now transferred to this project.
Harris
Mann worked on “production-ising” his concept and within weeks, the design
studio had produced a full-sized version of the car, which unlike the
Allegro, even at this early stage its design process was translating into a
good looking and interesting design. Notable Harris Mann trademarks were the
pronounced “wedge” shape (something that became increasingly popular
throughout the seventies) incorporating a long and low front end, high rear
end and fastback rear. Some notable design points were the concealed
windscreen wipers and towards the rear of the roofline, there was a raised
section that added usefully to the amount of down-force generated
aerodynamically by the car. The initial study for the ADO71, which was still
named Diablo, actually incorporated a hatchback rear end and this feature
would have enabled the ADO71 to fit in nicely with upcoming rivals such as
the Audi 100 Avant and Renault 20.
Some fairly wide-ranging decisions
needed to be made with regards to the production of the car: the first of
which was the dropping of the plan to use the 1750 E-Series engine in single
carburettor form. This decision was easily made because going on sales
projections forwarded by management, the Allegro and Maxi would all-but
use-up the entire capacity of Cofton Hackett and so, the B-Series would
continue to be used in this application. The single carburettor version of
the E-Series engine was also considerably less powerful than the B and
because the ADO71 would emerge only slightly less weighty than the ADO17, it
was felt that the newer engine would be less than ideal anyway. Long term
planning also meant that this decision needed to be made because the upcoming
O-Series engine was in the pipeline and back in 1971, this was still seen as
a straightforward OHC conversion of the B-Series and using the older engine
in the AD071 meant that the conversion to the O-Series (assuming the engine
was not available launch) would be a relatively straightforward affair.
It was at this early stage in the
proceedings that the questionable decision to offer the ADO71 as a saloon and
not a hatchback was made. Why this was so, comes down to the fact that
product planners felt that in the class that the car was aimed at, a hatch
back was seen being somewhat out of place (despite what Rover were doing at
Solihull with the SD1 at the same time)
- the hatchback concept being seen as an exclusively the province of
the small car. Also, because the ADO71 was conceived to replace the Austin
3-Litre as well as the ADO17 and BLMC were already well served in the middle
market with their hatchback Maxi; they did not want the new car to take sales
away from it. The Engineering department were also encouraged to shy away
from creating the car as five-door model because it would have added extra
weight and complexity, with only marginal improvements in accommodation.
Market research for BLMC also indicated that a saloon was what customers
wanted. Of course, the reality showed that by not producing a hatchback, the
company may have done themselves out of sales, especially in Europe – the subsequent
popularity of the format showed how wrong Austin-Morris were (certainly the
sales success of the SD1 was not impaired because it was a hatchback).
Charles Griffin was placed in charge
of developing the chassis of the ADO71 and the question of what system was to
be used was an easy one to answer. Hydragas, as first seen in the Allegro was
the obvious choice, differing only in detail from it in the set-up of its
front suspension, which actually mirrored the Maxi. To ensure pliant ride,
the spring rates in this application were exceptionally soft, but to back
this up, the unusual step was taken to design the ADO71 to use wide, low
profile tyres on narrow wheel rims; relying on lower than usual tyre
pressures and the resulting flexing of the tyres’ sidewalls to add further
ride softness. It has said to be that, if the intention was to achieve
Citroen-like ride, the chassis engineers reached their aims very easily; the
finished car had a ride quality that was almost in the same league as the
Citroen CX – certainly, it had none of the bounciness that afflicted the
Allegro.
Development work continued and some
wind tunnel of the shape was all that it was felt to be needed, which must
have been a relief to Harris Mann, who had seen his previous design, the
Allegro corrupted on its way to production. The final shape that emerged was
only slightly different from the original clay model of November 1971 and its
comparatively clean aerodynamic shape (co-efficient of drag was cd0.404 – not
in the same league as the Citroen CX, but certainly better than the
“domestic” opposition) was testament the initial “rightness” of Harris Mann’s
design. Accommodation was also marked out as a strong point; seat room was as
good as the ADO17 up front, only slightly worse at the rear and most
importantly, the driving position was far more reclined than the
sit-up-and-beg ADO17.
In development, it is
fair to say that all the aims set out for the car in 1970 were met – and a
great deal of credit for this should be laid at the feet of Charles Griffin,
who ensured that the AD071 project did not lose sight of its objectives.
When the ADO71 was launched on March
26th 1975, just weeks before the publication of the Ryder Report,
it did so to an enthusiastic press and public alike. Were there was a real
sense of disappointment at the ugliness of the Allegro, the 18-22 Series as
it was named, emerged a good looking and interesting car. The dealers must
have shared the same sense of relief, because whereas the Allegro sales never
got close to matching the sales ADO16, there was a real feeling that the new
car would comfortably outsell the ADO17. Certainly British Leyland’s own
forecasts reflected this view and the production facility at Cowley North
works was greatly modernised with an increased production volume in mind.
Mechanically, the ADO17 offered no
great surprises, with its choice of B and E6-Series engines, four speed
gearboxes and Hydragas suspension – the O-Series would have to wait for the
first facelift. The press lauded the car for its impressive stability and
speed, superior ride quality and well-sorted front wheel drive handling.
Importantly, BL learned lessons from the AD017 and fitted power assisted
steering to the car, offering it as standard on the 2200 and an optional
extra on the 1800 – the fact that the system made a huge difference to the
driving experience and the heavy low-geared manual set-up had dominated all
driving impressions of the ADO17. Another area that the old ADO17 was
criticised for was it spartan, workman like interior with acres of blank
dashboard. For the ADO71 stylists were given free reign to design a stylish
dashboard utilising the latest developments in plastic moulding techniques.
Interior accommodation was predictably praised and dashboard ergonomics –
never a strong point of the ADO17 – were described as, “futuristic”. The
question of the styling was unanswered, but few disagreed with the sentiment
at the time, that it was considerably more appealing than the Allegro, Maxi
and the AD017. When the morale at British Leyland, be it in the factories or
the dealers, was at its lowest ebb, it was seen as genuinely good news that
the company had something appealing to sell.
Indeed, after their test of the
2200HL of the 29th March 1975, Autocar summed up the car
favourably, “All in all, this is a most satisfactory car, which should do
much for Austin-Morris. We wish it well, and are confident that it will find
wide favour with the both business man seeking a refined, comfortable mile
eater and the family man who needs proper space for growing a brood.”
What was left unsaid in the test was
that the 110BHP 2200HL version with rather less than sparkling performance;
much was made of the excellent stability, superb ride and strong breaks, but
the straight line speed – or rather lack of it – was carefully glossed over.
The figures told a rather stark story though: 0-60 in13.5 seconds, maximum speed
of 104 mph, 50-70 in fourth gear took a yawning 13.2 seconds with an overall
fuel consumption figure of 20.7mpg. Most price rivals were significantly
quicker and to the customers this car was aimed at, this was important.
The car also boasted some built in
safety features, which included front impact crumple zones and the
availability of the new Dunlop Denovo runflat tyre system. But, the most
obvious safety feature was the large red seat belt warning light on the
dashboard, which winked and clicked ferociously if either front seat
passenger wasn’t wearing their seat belt. This was operated by a pressure
sensitive switch beneath each front seat - very hi-tech for 1975. But for
many this was an irritation, and most users wrapped the seat belts around the
back of the seat and connected them to the buckles, which was a rather crude
way of overriding the system when all they had to do was to remove the
flasher unit under the dashboard.
Marketing the car did also raise some
issues for the company’s management, but the only problem was one of
potential confusion in the minds of the cars customers. It would seem odd
that after the proclamation given by Donald Stokes that the company would no
longer enter the practice of badge engineering, that the car would be offered
in Austin, Morris and Wolseley guises. The marketing plan, however, dictated
that that it was necessary to launch the 18-22 Series in three different ways
because of the fact that after seven years in existence, British Leyland
still operated independent Austin and Morris franchises. At the time of the
launch of the 18-22 Series, the ADO77 Marina replacement was still only in
the early stages of development, but back in 1971 when the decision was made
to offer the ADO71 in three varieties, the Marina had just been launched and
product planners knew there would be no new Morris cars for a very long time.
Rightly, no thought was given to
producing a rear wheel drive version of the car to fit in with Donald Stokes’
policy that there should be a range of rear wheel drive Morris cars to
complement the front wheel drive Austin’s – even if it had, there were not
enough resources in the company to pursue such a plan. Clearly the 18-22 with
its advanced specification was an Austin in execution, but because producing
it so would have left Morris dealers at a real disadvantage, only having the
Mini and Marina to sell, it was decided to launch the car through both dealer
networks – also ensuring that all sales possibilities were maximised.
Of course, the obvious answer was to
unify Austin-Morris dealerships - a process that was gradually taking place
anyway, but the matter was finally brought to a close in September 1975, when
the 18-22 Series was renamed Princess; an event which sadly closed the book
on Wolseley. In response to recommendations of the Ryder Report and its wish
that there should be a ‘’single unified’’ car company, the Princess name, a
marque in its own right, apparently – was applied to the ADO71 range and used
in much the same way as the Mini had been since 1969. Now that the
Austin-Morris Princess (or Leyland Princess, as it was known as by just about
everyone) was firmly established on the market, it did not take long for the
cracks to show.
Unreliability was a problem that had
seemingly befell all British Leyland products since the Mini, but by 1975 the
problem was so bad and so public, that when the Princess started to develop
faults, they were national news. Nightmare stories of collapsing suspension
and driveshaft failures did not help BL at all and the fact that engineers
took such a long time eventually cure the problems only exacerbated the
company’s woes. Because the majority of British Leyland was now owned by the
Government and funded by taxpayers, special attention was paid to all aspects
of the company and as the Princess was its newest product, it was attracting
the most attention.
The company did all they could do,
hamstrung by bloody minded assembly-line workers and now limited financial
resources, so one of the immediate actions taken by them was to hire a new
man, Brigadier Charles Maple, who’s job it was to ensure that all quality was
as tight as it could possibly be within Austin Morris. The fact that the
Princess had failed so spectacularly and so publicly made it all the easier
for Maple to get down to work and make his presence felt; to act as an
effective quality overlord. Again, like the ADO17 before it – and the Austin
Montego after it – this initial reliability had predictable effects on
consumer confidence in the Princess. People did not buy the Princess in large
numbers; the Princess never lived up to the expectations that BL management
had for it, but unlike ADO17, which BMC left pretty much untouched for the
duration of the production run, the Princess was the subject of continuous
development.
In July 1978, the Princess 2
finally appeared, sporting the new O-Series engine, which was available in
1.7 and 2.0 litre forms to run alongside the existing 2227cc E6 power unit.
Various running changes were also made to the Princess and even though the
customers still found the cars lack of pace a turn off and its styling
challenging, sales continued running at a reasonable, if unspectacular level.
Due to this continuing tinkering by the backroom boys, the Princess did
eventually come good even if sales in the UK took a dive in 1979 due to the
Iranian crisis.
What Car magazine tested the 2000HLS
in 1980 and were quick to point out that the Princess had undergone a process
of subtle improvements and did not hesitate in recommending it (with
reservations) against a couple of obscure rivals. “…To concentrate on the BL
cars faults – and it has all too many, still – would be to ignore its one
overwhelming advantage, that of excellent passenger space and ride comfort,
unrivalled at the price. It may not be the most prestigious, attractive or
advanced alternative available, but for the motorist who places practicality
above speed and excitement it must still be the best bet.”
In the post-Austin Metro shake up of
the range the Princess 2 received a mild makeover to freshen it up for 1981,
but marketing support for the Wedge was dropped and the car was left to sell
itself in the corner of the showrooms as the Metro took the limelight. The
company knew that in order boost sales nothing less than a major facelift
would be the order of the day. Work began on the project in 1980 and the main
intention of the rework was to give the Princess a hatchback, because BL
managers were now openly admitting that the lack of a fifth door was costing
the company sales. Because the reputation of the Princess was just about on
the floor by 1980, it was decided that the facelift would be far reaching
enough to warrant a change of identity – from Princess to Ambassador in one
fell swoop.
When the Austin
Ambassador appeared in March 1982, the extent of the changes took
most BL watchers by surprise; most people expected that such a low-budget
make over would result in only cursory changes to the car – something similar
to the transformation that had taken place on the Morris Marina to become the
Morris Ital, in 1980. But what they actually got was a car that had every
body panel changed (barring the front outer door skins), monocoque changes to
the rear to accommodate the addition of a tailgate and a vastly different
front-end appearance. One of the significant contributors to the new look was
the lower bonnet line, which had been lowered. Now there was no need to
accommodate the tall E6 engine this change could be made along with an
improvement in aerodynamic penetration, but it did mean that the cleverly
concealed wipers of the Princess were now lost. Some of the undoubted
character of the Princess styling was absent, but it was undoubtedly an
effective facelift – and the extra ‘’sixth light’’ in the C-post eliminated a
huge blind spot of the Princess and contributed to a new and airier interior
ambience.
The interior makeover was, however,
disappointing. Whereas the 1975 Wolseley had superb multi adjustable front
seats that could be adjusted through 240 positions and sported the
extravagance of central armrests, the Ambassador made do with far more
ordinary cut-price chairs. The Princess also had a traditional looking, but
well planned dashboard, which was discarded in favour of a low cost
Allegro-esque item in the Ambassador, which not only managed to look and feel
cheaper, but also conveyed less information to the driver – even the
top-of-the-range Vanden Plas lacked a rev-counter.
The lack of such a basic item as a
tachometer reflected the fact that the people behind the cars facelift
seemingly did not understand the needs of their clientele. Most professional
drivers wanted a car that felt quick and was firm to drive – the Ambassador
was neither. One of the biggest criticisms of the Ambassador (and the
Princess before it) was its lack of go, even the most powerful version with
the twin carburettor 2-litre O-Series engine could only muster 104bhp and the
intended main seller, the 1.7 could not crack 100mph. Add to that a 0-60 time
of a yawning 14.8 seconds, compared to the all conquering Vauxhall Cavalier
1600’s time of 10.8 seconds and 107mph, and one can see why people were
ignoring the Ambassador in such large numbers.
That was the fundamental problem with
the Austin Ambassador, though; it just wasn’t what people wanted. Luckily,
small improvements were made to the suspension system – and if nothing else,
the sheer comfort and ride-absorption qualities of the Ambassador demonstrated
that Dr Alex Moulton’s Hydragas system could be made to work most effectively
and the car would stand as a monument to the effectiveness of Moulton’s
system.
When the Ambassador was
discontinued in 1984, to make way for the Montego, it had been in production
for barely two years and such was its lack of popularity it was not even
produced in left-hand-drive form.
Quite possibly, the Princess was the best car Austin Morris had
ever made up to that time. It was modern, it was stylish, it was spacious, it
offered adequate performance and was attractively priced. In fact, it was
leaps and bounds ahead of every other car made by Austin Morris.
Unfortunately, poor build quality allied to niggling engineering faults led
to the Princess being saddled with a dire reputation, and once it took hold
no amount of positive publicity could shake that reputation. When the Montego
first rolled out of Cowley, the company assumed that conservationism for the
sake of it would be a winning sales formula; they would be proved wrong. Why
the Princess failed was not because of its adventurous styling, its lack of a
hatchback or even because it was not fast enough; simply put, it failed
because it had a lamentable record for unreliability, which once gained,
could not be lost – no matter how hard they tried. If Austin-Morris had built
it well from the outset, the story may have been entirely different – but the
same could equally be said for so many other cars produced by the company
before and since.
Copyright 2001. Keith Adams.
Reproduced by kind permission of the
author.
Certain paragraphs added by Kevin
Davis.
Updated March 2013.
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The ADO17 ‘Land Crab’ was well packaged for its class,
but it didn’t sell very well.
Harris Manns ‘Zanda’ design exercise of 1969. Note the
rectangular exhaust exits at the rear
and low front end. Had it made it into production, a mid mounted 1750
Maxi engine could have powered it.
(With thanks to the
Heritage Motor Centre, Gaydon)
Manns original sketch
(top) and the first clay buck (bottom).
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